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TAB A

Effectiveness of USSR
Jamming Operations
Against the Voice of
America

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12 March 1953

# AGAINST THE VOICE OF AMERICA

This report is based on an analysis of the 1952 Penetration Report for the Voice of America. The Penetration Report is derived largely from radio reception reports which are prepared by the United States diplomatic posts in or near Voice of America target areas, and supplemented in some instances by reports of interviews of escapees, reports of listening panels, as well as monitoring 25X1C reports from Voice relay bases.

At the time the Penetration Report was written, supplementary sources of information were explored to the extent possible consistent with time available. It is believed that the data used in the Report represents the principal sources, but possibly not all available on the subject.

In this analysis it was noted that the reception reports were prepared from material derived from monitoring or "listening in" near Voice of America target areas. It was especially noted that reports taken from escapees were used only in those instances where the escapee demonstrated familiarity with program times, frequencies, names of announcers and such other data which would indicate a real knowledge of Voice of America programming.

It should also be noted that all programming, during the reporting period January to December 1952, was of a propaganda nature and as such was "fair game" for jamming; thus the statistics presented are not

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diluted by any soft programs of an unobjectionable nature.

A statistical summary derived from 2258 Embassy monitoring reports for 1952 revealed that programs directed to the European satellites on high frequency provided good or better reception on at least one of the program channels for 65% of the monitoring periods, 22% were fair to poor, and 13% were obliterated by jamming. Medium wave Broadcasts in the same area indicated 50% good or better, 31% fair to poor and 19% were obliterated. VOA Broadcasts directed to China and Korea provided reception in the target area of 97% good or better for High Frequency and 46% good or better for medium wave with no programming jammed to obliteration. VOA transmissions to non-satellite countries has provided a slightly higher average quality of reception than in the satellites.

25X1C

very closely for the same areas covered.

In contrast to this relatively high penetration in the satellite and non-satellite countries, there is only sporadic penetration within USSR proper. This is especially so in the large urban centers, for example reports from Moscow indicate that extremely strong jamming . makes reception generally impossible within the city with partial intelligibility being possible 9 miles outside of Moscow. There have been reports of good but irrigular reception in the more rural sections.

VOA as well as B.B.C. program relay channels have been relatively free from interruption from jamming. Circuit reliability averages range mostly between 85% to 95% reliability occasionally dropping to 70% at some bases, and very rarely lower 70% the lowest reliability

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reported (47%) was a Russian language program relay circuit to Manila 0315 to 0345 hours. At the other extreme Tangier received the same transmissions with 88% reliability and all other Russian and Ukrainian language program relays with 95% to 99% reliability. It should be understood that lack of reliability was not always due entirely to jamming alone but also from propagation irregularities, atmospherics, etc.

While some individuals intimately connected with VOA operations have within the past two months tended to anticipate a trend toward more jamming and less effective penetration, primarily because of physical evidence of new installations suspected of being additional jamming capacity, the latest reports do not yet bear out such a trend. However, it should be pointed out that the January-February 1953 reports are not yet complete.

#### SUMMARY

Agreement between reporting sources on major aspects tends to confirm the validity of the evaluations on degree of penetration for the VOA and 25×1C

The differential between intensive jamming in the USSR proper and the lesser jamming in the satellites may indicate that Soviet and satellite jamming is confined to their respective defensive needs, and thus that their legal position under the pertinent provisions of the ITU Convention is sound.

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